Online Supplementary Material to

The Unequal Challenge of Learning from Under-Informative News

Contents

Supplemental Results

Covariate-adjusted Results

Table A.1.1: Estimated ATE of Pooled Treatment on Information Recall, Covariate-adjusted

	Information Recall under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	−0.095	−0.393***	−0.641***
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.062)
Topic: Texas	0.640***	0.615***	0.179**
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Topic: SCOTUS	0.917***	0.866***	0.691***
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.060)
New York Resident	−0.144	−0.085	−0.092
	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.108)
Texas Resident	−0.034	0.022	0.160
	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.091)
Party ID	0.202	−0.016	0.034
	(0.145)	(0.137)	(0.142)
Ideology	−0.604***	−0.390*	−0.433**
	(0.167)	(0.159)	(0.162)
Male	0.113*	0.103*	0.252***
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Nonwhite	−0.127*	−0.191**	−0.103
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Education	0.050*	0.065**	0.133***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Income	0.001	0.037**	0.024
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Age	0.014***	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.619***	1.694***	1.223***
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.124)
Observations	2,232	2,232	2,232
R^2	0.139	0.133	0.131
Adjusted R^2	0.134	0.128	0.126
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.

Table A.1.2: Estimated ATE of Individual Styles on Information Recall, Covariate-adjusted

	Information Recall under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Style: Conflict	−0.101	−0.503***	−0.757***
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Style: Jargon	−0.035	−0.348***	−0.582***
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Style: Prediction	−0.128	−0.356***	−0.637***
	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.081)
Style: Clickbait	−0.124	−0.362***	−0.586***
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Topic: Texas	0.642***	0.615***	0.182**
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Topic: SCOTUS	0.918***	0.862***	0.692***
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.060)
New York Resident	−0.144	−0.085	−0.096
	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.109)
Texas Resident	−0.035	0.027	0.161
	(0.089)	(0.096)	(0.090)
Party ID	0.195	−0.020	0.026
	(0.145)	(0.137)	(0.142)
Ideology	−0.600***	−0.400*	−0.442**
	(0.168)	(0.159)	(0.162)
Male	0.112*	0.097	0.246***
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Nonwhite	−0.130*	−0.195***	−0.107
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Education	0.050*	0.064**	0.132***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Income	0.001	0.036**	0.023
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Age	0.014***	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.618***	1.708***	1.235***
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.124)
Observations	2,232	2,232	2,232
R^2	0.140	0.135	0.133
Adjusted R^2	0.134	0.129	0.128
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.

Table A.1.3: Pooled ATE on Recall Moderated by Political Engagement, Covariate-adjusted

	Information Recall under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	−0.201	−0.799***	−0.692***
	(0.197)	(0.188)	(0.187)
Political Engagement	1.304***	1.093***	1.422***
	(0.255)	(0.251)	(0.246)
Style*Engagement	0.181	0.663*	0.094
	(0.282)	(0.273)	(0.274)
Topic: Texas	0.651***	0.585***	0.193**
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.059)
Topic: SCOTUS	0.914***	0.852***	0.708***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)
New York Resident	−0.132	−0.067	−0.079
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.107)
Texas Resident	−0.057	0.0005	0.137
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.087)
Party ID	0.263	0.053	0.098
	(0.142)	(0.132)	(0.140)
Ideology	−0.544***	−0.318*	−0.375*
	(0.164)	(0.151)	(0.160)
Male	−0.008	−0.032	0.128*
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Nonwhite	−0.071	−0.128*	−0.044
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Education	0.011	0.021	0.093***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Income	−0.003	0.033**	0.019
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Age	0.006***	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.263***	1.540***	0.801***
	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.191)
Observations	2,232	2,232	2,232
R^2	0.190	0.195	0.180
Adjusted R^2	0.185	0.190	0.175
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.

Table A.1.4: Style ATE on Recall Moderated by Political Engagement, Covariate-adjusted

	Information Recall under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Style: Conflict	−0.143	−0.839***	−0.817***
	(0.246)	(0.240)	(0.240)
Style: Jargon	−0.111	−0.926***	−0.600**
	(0.248)	(0.224)	(0.228)
Style: Prediction	−0.331	−0.711**	−0.746**
	(0.260)	(0.238)	(0.233)
Style: Clickbait	−0.211	−0.705**	−0.596*
	(0.269)	(0.245)	(0.250)
Political Engagement	1.302***	1.100***	1.426***
	(0.255)	(0.252)	(0.246)
Conflict*Engagement	0.074	0.544	0.102
	(0.348)	(0.350)	(0.361)
Jargon*Engagement	0.107	0.905**	0.015
	(0.350)	(0.325)	(0.337)
Prediction*Engagement	0.343	0.586	0.193
	(0.368)	(0.346)	(0.346)
Clickbait*Engagement	0.181	0.596	0.058
	(0.380)	(0.354)	(0.367)
Topic: Texas	0.656***	0.586***	0.195**
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Topic: SCOTUS	0.917***	0.851***	0.708***
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.058)
New York Resident	−0.135	−0.068	−0.084
	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.107)
Texas Resident	−0.059	0.003	0.137
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.087)
Party ID	0.258	0.058	0.091
	(0.142)	(0.132)	(0.141)
Ideology	−0.544***	−0.341*	−0.384*
	(0.164)	(0.151)	(0.161)
Male	−0.008	−0.038	0.121*
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Nonwhite	−0.073	−0.129*	−0.048
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Education	0.011	0.020	0.091***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Income	−0.003	0.033**	0.019
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Age	0.006***	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.260***	1.553***	0.814***
	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.191)
Observations	2,232	2,232	2,232
R^2	0.191	0.198	0.183
Adjusted R^2	0.184	0.191	0.176
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.

Table A.1.5: Estimated ATE of Pooled Treatment on Perceived Informativeness, Covariate-adjusted

	Perceived Informativeness under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	−0.015	−0.013	−0.025*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Topic: Texas	−0.000	0.022*	−0.031**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Topic: SCOTUS	0.003	0.032**	−0.010
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
New York Resident	0.009	0.020	0.017
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)
Texas Resident	0.012	0.032*	0.033
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Party ID	−0.064**	−0.085***	−0.065**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Ideology	−0.089***	−0.093***	−0.126***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Male	0.010	0.019*	0.030**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Nonwhite	0.001	−0.013	−0.005
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Education	0.006	0.006	0.016***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income	0.002	0.003	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Constant	0.726***	0.679***	0.643***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Observations	2,232	2,232	2,232
R^2	0.075	0.091	0.090
Adjusted R^2	0.070	0.086	0.085
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.

Table A.1.6: Pooled ATE on Perceived Informativeness Moderated by Political Engagement, Covariate-adjusted

	Perceived Informativeness under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	0.029	−0.012	−0.030
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Political Engagement	0.292***	0.260***	0.293***
	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Style*Engagement	−0.069	0.0002	0.011
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Topic: Texas	0.002	0.018	−0.028*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Topic: SCOTUS	0.003	0.029**	−0.007
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
New York Resident	0.010	0.022	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Texas Resident	0.008	0.028	0.029
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Party ID	−0.054*	−0.074***	−0.052*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Ideology	−0.081***	−0.084***	−0.115***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Male	−0.010	−0.002	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Nonwhite	0.011	−0.003	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Education	−0.0002	−0.0005	0.008*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Income	0.001	0.003	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.001*	0.001	0.0002
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
Constant	0.618***	0.601***	0.553***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Observations	2,232	2,232	2,232
R^2	0.131	0.150	0.155
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.145	0.150
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.

Table A.1.7: Estimated Pooled ATE on Media Credibility, Covariate-adjusted

	Post-treatment Media Credibility	
	Overall	Moderated
	(1)	(2)
Under-informative Style	0.004	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.017)
Political Engagement		0.020
		(0.023)
Style*Engagement		−0.001
		(0.025)
New York Resident	0.016	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Texas Resident	0.001	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Party ID	−0.040***	−0.040***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Ideology	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Male	0.004	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Nonwhite	−0.016**	−0.015**
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education	0.005**	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	0.001	0.0005
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	0.0002	0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Pre-treatment Media Confidence	0.877***	0.874***
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	0.043***	0.038*
	(0.012)	(0.017)
Observations	2,232	2,232
R^2	0.787	0.787
Adjusted R^2	0.786	0.786
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.

Table A.1.8: Estimated Pooled ATE on Support for Norm-breaking Policies, Covariate-adjusted

	Post-treatment Norm-breaking Support Index		
	Pooled Styles	Moderated	Individual Styles
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	0.018**	0.049**	
	(0.006)	(0.018)	
Political Engagement		0.030	
		(0.025)	
Pooled Style*Engagement		−0.051	
		(0.027)	
Style: Conflict			0.021**
			(0.008)
Style: Jargon			0.006
			(0.007)
Style: Prediction			0.024**
			(0.008)
Style: Clickbait			0.021**
			(0.008)
New York Resident	0.016	0.015	0.016
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Texas Resident	−0.013	−0.013	−0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Party ID	0.006	0.006	0.008
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Ideology	0.038*	0.037*	0.038*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Male	0.009	0.010*	0.010*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Nonwhite	0.021***	0.021***	0.022***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	0.004	0.004*	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	−0.0002	−0.0001	−0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Pre-treatment Support Index	0.810***	0.807***	0.809***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constant	−0.018	−0.040*	−0.018
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Observations	2,231	2,231	2,231
R^2	0.668	0.669	0.669
Adjusted R^2	0.667	0.667	0.667
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.

Unadjusted Results

Table A.2.1: Estimated ATE of Pooled Treatment on Information Recall, Unadjusted

	Information Recall under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	−0.087	−0.390***	−0.600***
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Constant	2.745***	2.630***	2.200***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Observations	2,233	2,233	2,233
R^2	0.001	0.015	0.035
Adjusted R^2	0.0004	0.015	0.034
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. See Table A.1.1 for adjusted results.

Table A.2.2: Estimated ATE of Individual Styles on Information Recall, Unadjusted

	Information Recall under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Style: Conflict	−0.067	−0.507***	−0.720***
	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Style: Jargon	−0.064	−0.332***	−0.553***
	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Style: Prediction	−0.102	−0.367***	−0.584***
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.086)
Style: Clickbait	−0.121	−0.352***	−0.539***
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Constant	2.745***	2.630***	2.200***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Observations	2,233	2,233	2,233
R^2	0.001	0.018	0.037
Adjusted R^2	−0.001	0.016	0.035
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. See Table A.1.2 for adjusted results.

Table A.2.3: Pooled ATE on Recall Moderated by Political Engagement, Unadjusted

	Information Recall under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	−0.284	−0.792***	−0.680***
	(0.207)	(0.195)	(0.189)
Political Engagement	1.378***	1.215***	1.540***
	(0.269)	(0.255)	(0.247)
Style*Engagement	0.310	0.638*	0.122
	(0.301)	(0.285)	(0.280)
Constant	1.886***	1.872***	1.239***
	(0.184)	(0.175)	(0.169)
Observations	2,233	2,233	2,233
R^2	0.082	0.104	0.109
Adjusted R^2	0.081	0.102	0.108
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. See Table A.1.3 for adjusted results.

Table A.2.4: Style ATE on Recall Moderated by Political Engagement, Unadjusted

	Information Recall under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Style: Conflict	−0.232	−0.866***	−0.848***
	(0.258)	(0.247)	(0.243)
Style: Jargon	−0.304	−0.808***	−0.604**
	(0.257)	(0.239)	(0.230)
Style: Prediction	−0.315	−0.736**	−0.756**
	(0.270)	(0.250)	(0.233)
Style: Clickbait	−0.281	−0.759**	−0.501*
	(0.272)	(0.250)	(0.254)
Political Engagement	1.378***	1.215***	1.540***
	(0.269)	(0.255)	(0.247)
Conflict*Engagement	0.257	0.566	0.196
	(0.371)	(0.364)	(0.370)
Jargon*Engagement	0.360	0.735*	0.058
	(0.369)	(0.348)	(0.346)
Prediction*Engagement	0.335	0.584	0.268
	(0.389)	(0.366)	(0.352)
Clickbait*Engagement	0.278	0.675	−0.043
	(0.394)	(0.366)	(0.376)
Constant	1.886***	1.872***	1.239***
	(0.184)	(0.175)	(0.169)
Observations	2,233	2,233	2,233
R^2	0.083	0.106	0.112
Adjusted R^2	0.079	0.103	0.109
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. See Table A.1.4 for adjusted results.

Table A.2.5: Estimated ATE of Pooled Treatment on Perceived Informativeness, Unadjusted

	Perceived Informativeness under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	−0.010	−0.009	−0.020
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Constant	0.781***	0.750***	0.698***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	2,233	2,233	2,233
R^2	0.0004	0.0003	0.001
Adjusted R^2	−0.00001	−0.0002	0.001
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. See Table A.1.5 for adjusted results.

Table A.2.6: Pooled ATE on Perceived Informativeness Moderated by Political Engagement, Unadjusted

	Perceived Informativeness under:		
	No Time Constraint	Slight Time Constraint	Severe Time Constraint
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Under-informative Style	0.022	−0.022	−0.042
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Political Engagement	0.303***	0.273***	0.303***
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Style*Engagement	−0.053	0.020	0.034
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Constant	0.592***	0.579***	0.509***
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Observations	2,233	2,233	2,233
R^2	0.085	0.092	0.099
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.091	0.098
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. See Table A.1.6 for adjusted results.

Table A.2.7: Estimated Pooled ATE on Media Credibility, Unadjusted

	Post-treatment Media Credibility	
	Overall	Moderated
	(1)	(2)
Under-informative Style	0.005	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.017)
Political Engagement		0.027
		(0.023)
Style*Engagement		0.003
		(0.026)
Pre-treatment Media Confidence	0.907***	0.900***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	0.032***	0.019
	(0.007)	(0.015)
Observations	2,233	2,233
R^2	0.781	0.781
Adjusted R^2	0.780	0.781
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. See Table A.1.7 for adjusted results.

Table A.2.8: Estimated Pooled ATE on Support for Norm-breaking Policies, Unadjusted

	Post-treatment Norm-breaking Support Index		
	Pooled Styles (1)	Moderated (2)	Individual Styles (3)
Under-informative Style	0.017**	0.054**	
	(0.006)	(0.019)	
Political Engagement		0.038	
		(0.024)	
Pooled Style*Engagement		−0.058*	
		(0.027)	
Style: Conflict			0.017*
			(0.008)
Style: Jargon			0.008
			(0.008)
Style: Prediction			0.024**
			(0.008)
Style: Clickbait			0.022**
			(0.008)
Pre-treatment Support Index	0.831***	0.829***	0.831***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Constant	0.012*	−0.011	0.012*
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.006)
Observations	2,231	2,231	2,231
R^2	0.660	0.661	0.661
Adjusted R^2	0.660	0.660	0.660
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001			

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. See Table A.1.8 for adjusted results.

Item Response Theory Models

In this section, I present the results of item response theory (IRT) models of both pre-treatment and post-treatment factual knowledge questions asked or respondents in the study. Each model uses binary data (1 for a correct answer and 0 otherwise) for a set of variables that make up a single knowledge measure (a single pre-treatment measure, and one recall measure for each of the three vignette news stories) to estimate three parameters for each item in a logistic model (a "3PL" IRT model). The discrimination parameter α describes how well each individual item relates to the overall scale (formally, the maximum slope of the logistic curve); in this context, α indicates how well the item contributes to discriminating between those with more or less knowledge. Ideally, this parameter is positive and large for all items. The difficulty parameter β gives an indication how easy or difficult the item is (formally, the point at which likelihood of a correct answer crosses 50 percent, assuming no guessing), and accordingly where on the knowledge scale that item is likely to distinguish between more and less knowledgeable individuals. In this setting, a range of positive and negative β values across items is preferable, to be able to distinguish between low and very low knowledge as well as between high and very high knowledge. Finally, the pseudo-guessing parameter γ describes the estimated probability of a correct answer via guessing (formally, this raises the floor of the logistic function). In this setting, lower γ values are preferred because the scale is better able to capture actual knowledge rather than guesswork. The tables below provide the parameter values for each item used in each scale.

For all four scales, the estimated IRT models indicate that the items all strongly related to what the scale measures, provide a useful range of difficulty parameters to capture differences at many points along the scale, and show acceptably low guessing parameters.

Table A.3.1: IRT Model for Pre-treatment Political Knowledge Battery

Item	α	β	γ
House Speaker	2.520	−0.505	0.013
Senate Term	2.069	−0.200	0.256
Chief Justice	2.932	−0.433	0.060
Vice President	1.176	1.035	0.069
State Governor	1.444	−1.898	0.000
State Legislature	0.927	−1.142	0.000
Next Election	1.174	−2.882	0.001

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents.

Table A.3.2: IRT Model for Texas Story Post-treatment Recall Battery

Item	α	β	γ
Remove Officials	3.541	−0.376	0.042
Principles	2.147	−0.006	0.000
Houston	1.634	−0.690	0.005
Appointee	2.069	0.146	0.000

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents.

Table A.3.3: IRT Model for New York Story Post-treatment Recall Battery

Item	α	β	γ
Governor	1.425	−1.313	0.000
Competitiveness	3.778	1.593	0.082
Independent Official	3.337	1.169	0.085
State Constitution	2.968	−0.381	0.000

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents.

Table A.3.4: IRT Model for Supreme Court Story Post-treatment Recall Battery

Item	α	β	γ
Senate Bill	3.498	−0.545	0.000
Unreported Gifts	7.893	−0.846	0.008
All Justices	2.243	−0.991	0.002
Very Large	1.503	0.582	0.000

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents.

Perceived Informativeness Scale

I tested several items that could relate to perceptions of an article as informative versus uninformative through multiple pilot surveys with the treatment instruments (total $n = 294$). The items included respondents' perception of whether the article they had just read was "informative," "newsworthy," "useful," "credible," "balanced," "unclear" (reverse coded), and "biased" (reverse coded). I analyzed the correlations between these items and conducted principal components analyses (PCA) on subsets of these items to evaluate whether they captured a common concept and related closely to each other. From these analyses, "informative," "newsworthy," and "useful" emerged as a viable subset of items that correlated strongly with each other and captured a single common concept. I therefore employed these three items in the main study to measure perceived informativeness.

The much larger sample in the main study ($n = 2,233$) corroborates the findings from the pilot testing. In addition to the excellent internal reliability of the index (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.93$), a PCA of these three items shows that a single dimension describes the overwhelming majority (87.3 percent) of the total observed variance of the three items, as shown in the scree plot below.

Figure A.4.1: Scree Plot of PCA of the Perceived Informativeness Scale Items



Figure A.4.1: Figure displays a scree plot of a principal components analysis of the three items used for the perceived informativeness scale. Data from the full sample of 2,233 respondents.

Comparison of Mechanical vs. Psychological Effects

Do the penalties to information recall after exposure to contemporary news styles derive from a purely mechanical effect of paragraph order? That is, is the entire effect on information recall explained by where the public interest paragraph is positioned in the body of the vignette? The public interest style "control" condition positions the public interest paragraph as the first body paragraph (after the headline and introductory lede), whereas in most treatment conditions this paragraph is randomly positioned further down the article (in expectation, as the third body paragraph). Because the post-treatment recall questions focused on information that was stated most clearly and explicitly in the public interest paragraph for each story, simple ordering effects might explain the negative impact on recall.[1]

To test this possibility, I analyze paragraph ordering in the clickbait condition, for which *all four* body paragraphs are randomly ordered. For respondents in the clickbait condition ($n = 418$), the public interest paragraph was sometimes shown first and sometimes further down the article, while all clickbait respondents saw clickbait headlines and some elements of the lede were randomly drawn from the other conditions (and are thus equal in expectation). For each vignette, I regress the number of correct recall items on a set of binary variables for each possible public interest paragraph position (the first position is held as the reference category). I then re-estimate the covariate-adjusted ATE of treatment assignment (that is, the adjusted recall outcome for the pooled conflict, jargon, and prediction styles relative to recall in the public interest control; $n = 1,815$) and compare this estimated ATE against the coefficients for each public interest paragraph position in the clickbait treatment. In other words, I compare the size of the pooled treatment effect of exposure to three under-informative styles against the size of a pure ordering effect from paragraph randomization within the clickbait treatment group.[2]

SM Figure A.5.1 presents the results. As SM Figure A.5.1 shows, the estimated negative (pooled) effect on recall from exposure to a conflict, jargon, or prediction style is more severe than a simple ordering effect would imply, even when the public interest-styled information is placed at the very bottom of the article (as the fourth body paragraph). Further, the best comparison is between the pooled treatment effect (top row of each group) and the effect of placing the public interest paragraph

[1] Note that a purely mechanical effect would still align with the theoretical framework: I argue that contemporary styles of news coverage are under-informative in part because they relegate policy and governance information to the bottom of the "inverted pyramid." An additional psychological effect, if present, would compound this problem.

[2] The full results are reported in SM Table A.5.1 below. This comparative test for ordering effects is not preregistered.



Figure A.5.1: Figure displays the estimated ATE on information recall for pooled treatment (except clickbait style, $n = 1,815$) or by public interest paragraph position in the clickbait condition ($n = 418$, 1^{st} body paragraph position held as reference). The error bars indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. For full results, see SM Table A.5.1.

in the third position (third row of each group), because this is where, in expectation, that paragraph is positioned in all other treatment conditions. In this comparison, no matter the severity of the time constraint, exposure to a conflict, jargon, or prediction style results in a much larger loss in information recall. In other words, while there is clearly *some* mechanical effect of paragraph ordering, a substantial non-mechanical effect is also at work. I argue that this non-mechanical effect is a psychological function of learning from journalists' priorities: what journalists choose to emphasize early on suggests to consumers which information is most important, how to interpret everything that follows, and what to pay attention to, thus influencing how readers engage with content later in the story. When the news style does not prioritize important policy-relevant and normative information, recall of such information suffers above and beyond the mechanical function of reduced exposure from content ordering.

Table A.5.1: Comparison of Treatment vs. Ordering Effects, Covariate-adjusted

	Information Recall under: No Time Constraint		Slight Time Constraint		Severe Time Constraint	
	Excl. Clickbait (1)	Clickbait Only (2)	Excl. Clickbait (3)	Clickbait Only (4)	Excl. Clickbait (5)	Clickbait Only (6)
Under-informative Style (excl. Clickbait)	−0.087		−0.403***		−0.661***	
	(0.060)		(0.063)		(0.064)	
DF Paragraph in 2nd Position		0.145		0.044		−0.034
		(0.165)		(0.155)		(0.168)
DF Paragraph in 3rd Position		0.113		−0.134		−0.193
		(0.175)		(0.168)		(0.166)
DF Paragraph in 4th Position		0.013		−0.399*		−0.425**
		(0.165)		(0.169)		(0.161)
Topic: Texas	0.659***	0.552***	0.615***	0.623***	0.194**	0.118
	(0.068)	(0.133)	(0.069)	(0.148)	(0.067)	(0.138)
Topic: SCOTUS	0.952***	0.724***	0.860***	0.845***	0.748***	0.453***
	(0.061)	(0.146)	(0.064)	(0.137)	(0.067)	(0.135)
New York Resident	−0.147	−0.098	−0.062	−0.236	0.011	−0.523**
	(0.127)	(0.213)	(0.130)	(0.212)	(0.130)	(0.175)
Texas Resident	0.002	−0.112	0.082	−0.212	0.199*	0.008
	(0.097)	(0.216)	(0.105)	(0.246)	(0.099)	(0.213)
Party ID	0.332*	−0.247	0.047	−0.191	0.078	−0.021
	(0.161)	(0.323)	(0.153)	(0.304)	(0.157)	(0.327)
Ideology	−0.733***	−0.170	−0.447*	−0.230	−0.513**	−0.297
	(0.186)	(0.376)	(0.178)	(0.346)	(0.179)	(0.379)
Male	0.120*	0.066	0.114*	0.030	0.278***	0.167
	(0.054)	(0.121)	(0.057)	(0.118)	(0.058)	(0.119)
Nonwhite	−0.105	−0.215	−0.220***	0.021	−0.112	−0.027
	(0.062)	(0.138)	(0.065)	(0.133)	(0.066)	(0.136)
Educ	0.066**	−0.024	0.086***	−0.035	0.137***	0.122*
	(0.022)	(0.048)	(0.023)	(0.046)	(0.023)	(0.050)
Income	0.005	−0.017	0.039**	0.033	0.028*	−0.003
	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.030)
Age	0.015***	0.009*	0.008***	0.001	0.007***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Constant	1.480***	2.072***	1.581***	2.048***	1.132***	1.258***
	(0.123)	(0.293)	(0.127)	(0.293)	(0.135)	(0.300)
Observations	1,814	418	1,814	418	1,814	418
R^2	0.156	0.092	0.144	0.130	0.150	0.084
Adjusted R^2	0.151	0.061	0.138	0.100	0.144	0.052
	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001					

Note: Data from full sample of 2,233 respondents. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. Columns (1), (3), and (5) estimate pooled treatment effects for each time constraint, excluding all clickbait-style observations. Columns (2), (4), and (6) estimate paragraph-ordering effects within clickbait-style observations only. This analysis was not preregistered.

Linearity of Interaction Effects

Hypothesis 2 predicts that baseline political engagement moderates the negative effects of "under-informative" news styles on information recall, such that less engaged individuals recall less information and more engaged individuals recall more information. I preregistered a formal test of this hypothesis via a linear interaction effect. But is an assumption of linearity justified? To assess this assumption, I plot the observed recall and engagement values by treatment condition (public interest or under-informative), and plot LOESS nonparametric smoothing functions for each condition to allow for possible non-linearity in the observed data. Figure A.6.1 below shows the observed values (jittered for visibility on discrete scales) for respondents assigned to public interest vignettes (purple) versus under-informative vignettes (black) and the corresponding LOESS functions with 90 percent confidence intervals. For all three vignettes (under the respective time constraints), the LOESS functions for both treatment and control groups are broadly linear in form, with some deviation in the extreme tails of political engagement where there are few observations and wide confidence intervals. Because this informal analysis does not suggest a non-linear relationship, I do not extend beyond the linear test called for in the preregistration.



Figure A.6.1: Figure displays the (jittered) observed number of correct answers on recall items and baseline political engagement score, conditional on vignette time constraint and treatment assignment. Figure also displays LOESS nonparametric smoothing functions of these data; each line represents the smoothed local average and the shaded areas indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. All panels use the full sample ($n = 2,233$).

Study Information

The data for this study come from a non-probability convenience sample of the U.S. general adult population (n = 2,249) recruited from the Prolific respondent pool via quota sampling to ensure a gender-balanced sample. The study was conducted by the author and funded by a grant of the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation and by a J. Peter Euben Graduate Research Grant in Political Science from the Worldview Lab at the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. The study was fielded on September 21st–22nd, 2023, via the Qualtrics online survey platform. The study was approved by Duke University's Institutional Review Board under protocol #2024-0002. Respondents received $2.50 to complete the survey; the median respondent completed the survey in 16.2 minutes. Anonymized preregistration materials for this study are available at https://osf.io/9jy4e.

After consenting to participate in the study, participants were screened for eligibility in several ways. First, they were asked to correctly identify a single-digit number shown in an image on the screen. Second, they were asked to verify their age and state of residence. Third, they were asked whether they would answer the survey honestly. Nine failed to correctly identify the number on the screen, seven reported being less than 18 years of age, and 13 did not agree to answer the survey honestly; these were terminated from the study. A total of 2,405 respondents passed these screening questions and were recruited into the study. Two additional respondents failed a pre-treatment attention check, which asked respondents to correctly select the letters "C" and "D" from among five options, and were terminated from the study. A further 154 respondents failed to reach the last page of the study, and are not included in the analyses. The total number of complete valid responses is thus 2,249.

Finally, 16 respondents were excluded from the analysis for extreme speeding (completing the survey in less than 1/3 of the media time, or less 324 seconds) or failing at least two of the following additional quality checks: self-reported age and birth year do not correspond, within a tolerance of +/- 2 years; self-reported state of residence and zip code do not match; non-sequitur or item non-response to an open-ended question about preferred news source; reporting "a lot" or "some" use in the past week of a social media platform that does not exist; speeding, defined by completion in less than 1/3 of the median time (or less than 485 seconds). All of the screening and exclusion criteria were preregistered. The exclusions reduce the final analysis sample to n = 2,233 respondents. SM B.1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The observations are not weighted. As with all survey research, the design

and collection of data has limitations, and resulting estimates may involve unmeasured error that limits representativeness to the target population.

Sample Characteristics

Table B.1: Sample Characteristics on Selected Variables

		Percent of Sample
Age	18–29	19.3
	30–39	29.9
	40–49	19.4
	50–59	15.9
	60+	15.5
Gender	Male	49.8
	Female	48.5
	Other Gender	1.7
Race	Asian or Asian-American	7.7
	Black or African-American	12.7
	Hispanic or Latino	9.2
	Middle Eastern	0.6
	Native American or Alaska Native	1.5
	Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander	0.2
	White	76.1
	Other Race	0.6
Education	Less than High School	0.9
	High School or GED	13.3
	Some College	20.1
	Associate's Degree	10.4
	Bachelor's Degree	41.0
	Postgraduate Degree	14.4
Employment	Full-time	60.1
	Part-time	15.3
	Unemployed	10.8
	Retired	7.5
	Student	2.6
	Something Else	3.8
Household Income	Less than $20,000	11.2
	$20,000 to $39,000	19.0
	$40,000 to $59,000	18.1
	$60,000 to $79,000	17.0
	$80,000 to $99,000	12.1
	$100,000 to $149,000	14.0
	$150,000+	7.4
Partisanship	Democrat	48.8
	Independent	30.8
	Republican	20.5

Note: Data from analysis sample of 2,233 respondents.

Balance Tests

Table B.2.1 provides balance tests of treatment assignment with respect to the control covariates (demographics and pre-treatment measures of political attitudes and engagement). These tests indicate good balance across the treatment arms and successful randomization. Of 36 tests, only two show statistical significant differences (party ID and ideology on assignment to the conflict style treatment arm); in both cases these differences are substantively minor, amounting to about one-third of a single step along the standard 7-point scale for each measure.

Table B.2.1: Balance Tests

		Conflict		*Jargon*		*Prediction*		*Clickbait*	
Variable	Control	Diff.	p	Diff.	p	Diff.	p	Diff.	p
Age	42.299	0.707	0.450	−0.055	0.953	0.312	0.740	1.100	0.231
Male	0.479	−0.039	0.237	0.057	0.082	0.043	0.202	0.033	0.331
Nonwhite	0.308	−0.032	0.282	0.026	0.401	−0.002	0.960	−0.021	0.497
Education	3.175	−0.022	0.803	0.012	0.890	0.111	0.215	0.057	0.526
Income	2.902	−0.071	0.619	0.095	0.504	0.130	0.377	0.107	0.459
Unemployed	0.100	0.005	0.794	0.007	0.742	0.001	0.964	0.029	0.175
Party ID	3.228	−0.320	0.018*	0.123	0.378	−0.244	0.072	0.090	0.533
Ideology	3.367	−0.340	0.005**	0.027	0.825	−0.179	0.136	0.107	0.639
Pol. Eng.	0.623	0.003	0.826	0.009	0.521	0.003	0.851	−0.008	0.605

Note: Data from 2,233 respondents. The table displays the mean value of each variable for the control group, and the mean difference from the control mean for each treatment group and the associated p-value of a t-test comparing these means.

Survey Questionnaire

Consent and Screening

Thank you for your interest in participating in this survey by researchers at [REDACTED]. This research study will ask you questions about you and your opinions about topics in the news. We expect this survey to take about 15 minutes to complete. After completing the survey, you will be paid $2.50 for your participation. You may withdraw at any time and you may refuse to answer any question, but you must proceed to the final screen of the survey in order to receive payment. In accordance with Prolific policies, we may reject your submission if the survey was not completed correctly, you fail to complete an attention check appropriately, or the instructions were not followed. Your participation is voluntary. We do not ask for your name or any other information that might identify you. Although collected data may be made public or used for future research purposes, your identity will always remain confidential. If you have any questions about the research, please contact the researchers at [EMAIL]. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, contact Duke's Campus Institutional Review Board at [EMAIL] or at [PHONE]. If writing to the Campus IRB, please reference protocol ID #2024-0002.

- I consent to participate, begin the study.
- I do NOT consent.

We have just a few questions to confirm your eligibility for the survey. [Image of the number 3 in a box.] Please select the number shown in the box above.

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

What is your age in years? Please enter a whole number:

- (Text box.)

In which state do you currently reside?

- I do not reside in the United States
- Alabama
- ...
- Wyoming

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? *"I will answer this survey honestly."*

- Completely disagree
- Moderately disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Slightly agree
- Moderately agree
- Completely agree

News Consumption

Thanks! You have qualified for the survey. We want to begin by asking you some questions about topics in the news. Politics can be fast-paced, and many people do not follow every new story. How often do you pay attention to what's going on in politics, if at all?

- Always
- Most of the time
- About half the time
- Sometimes
- Not at all

Generally speaking, how interested are you in political campaigns, if at all?
- Not at all interested
- Slightly interested
- Moderately interested
- Very interested
- Extremely interested

During a typical week, how many days, if any, do you watch, read, or listen to news about politics?
- 0 days
- 1 day
- ...
- 7 days

In the past week, have you... (please check all that apply)
- Used social media (such as Facebook or YouTube)
- Watched news on television
- Read a newspaper (in print or online)
- Listened to a radio news program, talk radio, or news podcast
- None of these

How much, if at all, have you used the following social media platforms in the past week? *[Options: A lot; Some; Not at all]*
- Facebook
- X (Twitter)
- YouTube
- Instagram
- JiveHive
- TikTok

What source of news do you use most often?
- (Text entry.)

How often, if at all, do you think you can count on the news media to be accurate?
- Always
- Most of the time
- About half the time
- Sometimes
- Never

How often, if at all, do you consider the news media to be trustworthy?
- Always
- Most of the time
- About half the time

- Sometimes
- Never

How often, if at all, do you find the news media to be informative?
- Always
- Most of the time
- About half the time
- Sometimes
- Never

Political Attitudes

Next, we would like to ask you some questions about yourself and your opinions. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?
- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other party (please specify)

[If Democrat] Would you call yourself a strong Democrat, or a not very strong Democrat?
- Strong
- Not very strong

[If Republican] Would you call yourself a strong Republican, or a not very strong Republican?
- Strong
- Not very strong

[If Neither] Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or to the Republican Party?
- Closer to the Democratic Party
- Closer to the Republican Party
- Neither

Where would you place yourself on this scale?
- Extremely liberal
- Mostly liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Middle of the road
- Slightly conservative
- Mostly conservative
- Extremely conservative

Now we'd like to get your feelings toward some groups on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 means you feel very cold towards them and 100 means that you feel very warm towards them. How would you rate your feelings towards...
...the Democratic Party?
- (Text box.)

...the Republican Party?

- (Text box.)

Policy Support

How much would you support oppose actions by [legislators / Democratic legislators / Republican legislators] to...

...adopt different election laws for different areas under their jurisdiction?
- Completely support
- Moderately support
- Slightly support
- Slightly oppose
- Moderately oppose
- Completely oppose

...draw legislative district lines to give their political party an advantage in the next election?
- Completely support
- ...
- Completely oppose

...require court officials to obey strict ethics standards?
- Completely support
- ...
- Completely oppose

Political Knowledge

Next, we're going to ask you some questions about public affairs. Many people have trouble answering questions like these, so if you can't think of the answer, please select "I don't know." It is important to us the you do NOT use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources?
- Yes
- No

Who is the current Speaker of the US House of Representatives?
- Nancy Pelosi
- Harry Reid
- Kevin McCarthy
- Paul Ryan
- I don't know

How long is the term of office for a US Senator?
- 2 years
- 4 years
- 6 years
- 8 years

- I don't know

What job or political office is now held by John Roberts?
- Chair of the Democratic National Committee
- Senate Majority Leader
- Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
- Chair of the Republican National Committee
- I don't know

Who is the current President of the U.S. Senate?
- Elizabeth Warren
- Kamala Harris
- Chuck Schumer
- Mitch McConnell
- I don't know

Is the [governor] of [your state] a member of the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or neither?
- Democratic Party
- Republican Party
- Neither
- I don't know

Which political party currently controls most seats in the [lower chamber] of [your state]?
- Democratic Party
- Republican Party
- Neither
- I don't know

In what year will the next election for President of the United States take place?
- Year: (Text box.)
- I don't know

In what year did the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) decide the case *North Carolina v. Alford*?
- Year: (Text box.)
- I don't know

Attention Check

What are the third and fourth letters of the English alphabet? This is an attention check question and the correct answer is C and D (please select both).
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E

On the next page, we'll show you an article about a recent news story in the United States. We want to know what people learn from news stories like this one. You can spend as much time reading it as you like. Afterwards, we will ask you some questions about the story and the information in the article.

Programming note: The order of the three news stories and associated outcome questions was randomized, as was the style of the article (including headline, framing snippets in the lede, and the ordering of the body paragraphs). The Texas story is arbitrarily presented first here, with the body paragraphs arbitrarily ordered public interest, conflict, jargon, prediction *(framing snippets are provided in the same order). Regardless of which story was presented as the first vignette, the respondent had no limit on how long they could view the article. The randomized headlines for the Texas story were "Texas Legislature Imposes Unique Election Laws on Largest City" (public interest style), "Texas Dems Ready for Legal Fight Over Republican Election Laws" (conflict style), "Texas's Abbott Signs Bill to Expand Sec.of State's Election Powers" (jargon style), "New Texas Bill Boosts Republicans' Chance to Retain House Majority" (prediction style), "You'll Never Guess What Texas Just Changed in New Election Law" (clickbait style).*

Randomized Headline

A new election law in Texas is poised to [allow extraordinary interference in local Houston elections by state officials / launch state Republicans and Houston Democrats into court fights over elections / grant Secretary of State Nelson new election powers over Houston / give Republicans a boost in several closely watched Houston races], with key implications for [democratic rights / partisan matchups / McCarthy's tenure / House control] in the 2024 elections.

[Public Interest] The unusual election policies adopted by the Republican-controlled state legislature apply only to the 4.8 million residents of Houston's home county—but not other Texas voters. The change gives an unelected official, appointed by the Republican governor, extraordinary powers to remove two locally-elected officials from office and to directly administer local elections. Voting rights advocates say the law undercuts principles of self-government, denying local voters their choice of representatives.

[Conflict] After adopting the new rules for the Democratic stronghold, Texas Republicans defended the measures by accusing Houston Democrats of bungling last year's elections. GOP lawmakers observed that some polling sites opened late on Election Day, making some voters wait or miss voting. But local Democrats say they've already fixed those problems, calling them rare, and lambasted Republicans for a naked power grab that they promise to fight in court.

[Jargon] Jane Nelson, a former Republican state senator and current Secretary of State appointed of Governor Greg Abbott, will soon enjoy new authority in Texas's Harris County. Under the new law, Nelson can remove the County Clerk and County Assessor of Harris County, and directly oversee election administration and voter registration in the county, upending the traditional roles these two local offices have held in Texas elections.

[Prediction] The new election rules in Houston are expected benefit Republicans seeking to retain their slim four-seat majority in the House of Representatives in Washington, as well as their majorities in both chambers of the state legislature. With Republican state

officials taking over elections in the liberal stronghold, Democrats fear that the shift will create enough voter confusion to tip several races to Republicans next year.

Next, we'd like to ask you a few questions about the story you just viewed.

To what extent, if any, would you say that the article you just viewed was...

...engaging?
- Strongly agree
- Moderately agree
- Slightly agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Moderately disagree
- Strongly disagree

...informative?
- Strongly agree
- ...
- Strongly disagree

...newsworthy?
- Strongly agree
- ...
- Strongly disagree

...useful?
- Strongly agree
- ...
- Strongly disagree

According to the article, the new election law in Texas...
- ...allows the Texas Secretary of State to remove elected officials from office
- ...increases the number of times the Texas Governor can run for re-election
- ...imposes new term limits on Texas state Senators
- ...prohibits early voting in off-cycle special elections
- ...requires each Texas county to provide an annual report on election fraud

According to the article, voting rights advocates have criticized the new Texas law because it...
- ...undermines principles of self-government
- ...increases election administration costs
- ...will reduce transparency in campaign spending
- ...will lead to more election fraud
- ...makes filing to run for office more difficult

According to the article, the new Texas law will directly affect...
- ...the city of Houston
- ...the city of El Paso
- ...rural counties

- ...areas along the state's border with Mexico
- ...the entire state

According to the article, the new Texas law gives election powers to...
- ...an official appointed by the Texas Governor
- ...the Texas Governor
- ...the state legislature
- ...local county officials
- ...a non-governmental election watchdog organization

Now we'd like to get your feelings toward some groups on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 means you feel very cold towards them and 100 means that you feel very warm towards them. How would you rate your feelings towards...

...Texas Democrats?
- (Text box.)

...Texas Republicans?
- (Text box.)

Second Vignette

Next, we'll show you a different article about another recent news story. As before, we want to know what people learn from news stories like this one. This time, you will only have 60 seconds to view the article. Afterwards, we will again ask you some questions about the story and the information in the article.

Programming note: The order of the three news stories and associated outcome questions was randomized, as was the style of the article (including headline, framing snippets in the lede, and the ordering of the body paragraphs). The New York story is arbitrarily presented second here, with the body paragraphs arbitrarily ordered public interest, conflict, jargon, prediction *(framing snippets are provided in the same order). Regardless of which story was presented as the second vignette, the respondent had a maximum 60 seconds to view the article. The randomized headlines for the New York story were "New York Court of Appeals Weighs Overturning Neutral Voting Maps" (public interest style), "Democrats and Republicans Spar Over District Maps in New York" (conflict style), "Court of Appeals Gets Final Say on New York Reapportionment, Again" (jargon style), "New York Redistricting Decision Threatens Republican House Majority" (prediction style), "This Obscure Lawsuit Could Have a Big Impact in 2024 Election" (clickbait style).*

Randomized Headline

New York state's highest court will soon consider whether [the state legislature can draw new, partisan Congressional district maps / to hand Democrats power to redraw Republicans' preferred voting maps / to uphold a ruling overturning previous court-ordered district maps / to shift the advantage to Democrats in upcoming Congressional races]. The case will have far-reaching effects on [election fairness / party advantage / incumbency advantages / House margins] when voters go to the polls next year.

[Public Interest] Last year, New York's Court of Appeals ruled that the Democrat-controlled legislature unfairly favored Democrats when drawing new Congressional district lines, a practice known as "gerrymandering" that is forbidden by the state constitution. The current districts were drawn by a neutral, court-appointed official to make elections more competitive. Leading state Democrats, including the Governor, are supporting a lawsuit to throw out those independent maps and let the legislature redraw.

[Conflict] Both parties have been quick to accuse the other of hijacking the normal process of redrawing Congressional districts after each decade's Census, leading to a cascade of lawsuits in courtrooms across the country. While Democrats are seeking to overturn New York's maps, which enabled Republicans to flip four House seats last year, North Carolina's Republican-led legislature is doing the same to overturn that state's court-ordered maps.

[Jargon] The litigation over New York's Congressional district maps has been extensive. First Republicans sued successfully to overturn the Democrat-led legislature's maps, resulting in court-ordered maps taking effect for the 2022 election. Then Democrats sued to overturn those maps, and an appellate court ruled in Democrats' favor in July. Formally, an Independent Redistricting Commission would draw the next maps, but likely gridlock would let the legislature draw their own instead.

[Prediction] If New York's Court of Appeals upholds a ruling that overturns the current Congressional districts, it could doom Republican's hopes of keeping their slim majority in the House of Representatives. A final ruling is expected later this year. Democrats in the state legislature are likely to draw favorable district lines, which may be enough to sink four or more freshman House Republicans, helping Democrats retake the chamber.

Next, we'd like to ask you a few questions about the story you just viewed.

To what extent, if any, would you say that the article you just viewed was...

...engaging?
- Strongly agree
- Moderately agree
- Slightly agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Moderately disagree
- Strongly disagree

...informative?
- Strongly agree
- ...
- Strongly disagree

...newsworthy?
- Strongly agree
- ...
- Strongly disagree

...useful?
- Strongly agree

- ...
- Strongly disagree

According to the article, the Governor of New York is...
- ...supporting a lawsuit that seeks to redraw the state's Congressional districts
- ...indicating her intent to veto an amendment to the state constitution
- ...opposing an effort by federal lawmakers to reduce election funding for the state
- ...expressing concern about a recent decline in voter turnout in the state
- ...requesting that the state legislature draft new laws to combat voter fraud

According to the article, New York's current Congressional districts were drawn with specific intent to...
- ...increase election competitiveness
- ...favor Democrats
- ...favor Republicans
- ...increase the number of majority-minority districts
- ...always conform to county lines

According to the article, New York's current electoral districts were drawn by...
- ...an independent court-appointed official
- ...a bipartisan court-appointed panel
- ...Democratic state lawmakers
- ...the state's Independent Redistricting Commission
- ...a bipartisan committee of state lawmakers

According to the article, the New York state constitution...
- ...prohibits partisan gerrymandering
- ...prohibits public funding of political campaigns
- ...provides public campaign funding for an incumbent governor
- ...requires a new election if less than half of eligible voters cast a ballot
- ...requires amendments to obtain two-thirds approval of the voters

Now we'd like to get your feelings toward some groups on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 means you feel very cold towards them and 100 means that you feel very warm towards them. How would you rate your feelings towards...

...New York Democrats?
- (Text box.)

...New York Republicans?
- (Text box.)

Third Vignette

Next, we'll show you a third (and final) article about another recent news story. As before, we want to know what people learn from news stories like this one. This time, you will only have 30 seconds to view the article. Afterwards, we will again ask you some questions about the story and the information in the article.

Programming note: The order of the three news stories and associated outcome questions was randomized, as was the style of the article (including headline, framing snippets in the lede, and the ordering of the body paragraphs). The Supreme Court story is arbitrarily presented third here, with the body paragraphs arbitrarily ordered public interest, conflict, jargon, prediction *(framing snippets are provided in the same order). Regardless of which story was presented as the third vignette, the respondent had a maximum of 30 seconds to view the article. The randomized headlines for the Supreme Court story were "Congress Weighs Ethics Rules for Supreme Court After Several Lapses" (public interest style), "Democrats Push New Rules on Supreme Court, Angering Conservatives" (conflict style), "Justices Need New Disclosure Rules, Says Senate Judiciary Committee" (jargon style), "Supreme Court Ethics Bill Faces Doomed Prospects in Senate, House" (prediction style), "The Stunning Numbers Behind the Senate's Supreme Court Ethics Bill" (clickbait style).*

Randomized Headline

The Senate Judiciary Committee advanced a bill [that proposes stronger ethics standards for all Supreme Court justices / along party lines, proposing new ethics standards for Court justices / expanding rules governing Supreme Court justices' financial disclosures and recusals / on Supreme Court ethics, but it remains unlikely to pass]. The Committee vote comes amid [reports of widespread ethics failures / several major conservative Court victories / sparring over Congress's regulatory powers / several stalled Court reform bids] in recent years.

[Public Interest] In recent months, numerous news reports have described lavish gifts and all-expenses-paid vacations that justices have received from wealthy individuals who stood to benefit from favorable Court rulings. Often, the justices did not report the gifts—even when valued at more than $100,000. The Senate bill would strengthen gift reporting requirements for all justices and clarify when justices are required to recuse themselves because of a conflict of interest.

[Conflict] The bill advanced on an 11-10 vote, with all Democrats supporting and all Republicans opposing. Republicans on the Committee accused Democrats of trying to smear the Supreme Court's reputation, calling the bill partisan retaliation for several recent conservative victories on the Court, including on abortion, environmental regulation, and affirmative action. Democrats countered that the public's confidence in the Court has fallen, and new ethics rules would help restore it.

[Jargon] Whether Congress has the Constitutional authority to impose a binding ethics code on the justices at all remains a subject of debate. Already, justices on the Court have pushed back. The Chief Justice declined to appear before the Committee to discuss Court ethics. Several justices have also publicly aired their belief that, as a co-equal branch, the Court is not subject to Congressional oversight.

[Prediction] The bill is all but doomed. Although Democrats passed the bill out of committee, they will need to find some Republican support to succeed in a Senate floor vote—and such support appears to be scarce. Much like other recent reform bids, even if Democrats somehow managed to secure Senate approval, Republican opposition in the House means that the bill is unlikely to even get a hearing there.

Next, we'd like to ask you a few questions about the story you just viewed.

To what extent, if any, would you say that the article you just viewed was...

...engaging?

- Strongly agree
- Moderately agree
- Slightly agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Moderately disagree
- Strongly disagree

...informative?
- Strongly agree
- ...
- Strongly disagree

...newsworthy?
- Strongly agree
- ...
- Strongly disagree

...useful?
- Strongly agree
- ...
- Strongly disagree

According to the article, the Senate advanced a bill that would...
- ...strengthen gift reporting requirements for the Supreme Court
- ...expand the number of Supreme Court justices from 9 to 13
- ...impose new financial disclosure requirements on Senate staffers
- ...require political action committees to disclose the identities of donors
- ...alter the process of approving new Supreme Court justices

According to the article, Supreme Court justices have been under scrutiny because of...
- ...failures to report receiving expensive gifts
- ...plagiarism in personal memoirs and other books
- ...plagiarism in official opinions and dissents
- ...misues of government funds to purchase alcohol
- ...unethical hiring practices for Supreme Court clerks

According to the article, the ethics requirements proposed in the Senate bill would apply to...
- ...all Supreme Court justices
- ...the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court only
- ...Conservative Supreme Court justices only
- ...Liberal Supreme Court justices only
- ...future Supreme Court justices only

According to the article, unreported gifts to Court justices are concerning in part because...
- ...they are very large
- ...the have gone primarily to conservative justices
- ...they have gone primarily to liberal justices
- ...they raise questions about similar gifts to Senators

- ...they raise questions about Congressional authority

Now we'd like to get your feelings toward some groups on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 means you feel very cold towards them and 100 means that you feel very warm towards them. How would you rate your feelings towards...

...Supreme Court Justices?
- (Text box.)

...Congressional Democrats?
- (Text box.)

...Congressional Republicans?
- (Text box.)

General Outcome Measures

Thank you. We have a few more questions about you and your opinions.

How often, if at all, do you think you can count on the news media to be accurate?
- Always
- Most of the time
- About half the time
- Sometimes
- Never

How often, if at all, do you consider the news media to be trustworthy?
- Always
- Most of the time
- About half the time
- Sometimes
- Never

How often, if at all, do you find the news media to be informative?
- Always
- Most of the time
- About half the time
- Sometimes
- Never

How much would you support oppose actions by [legislators / Democratic legislators / Republican legislators] to...

...adopt different election laws for different areas under their jurisdiction?
- Completely support
- Moderately support
- Slightly support

- Slightly oppose
- Moderately oppose
- Completely oppose

...draw legislative district lines to give their political party an advantage in the next election?
- Completely support
- ...
- Completely oppose

...require court officials to obey strict ethics standards?
- Completely support
- ...
- Completely oppose

Demographics

Finally, we have some background questions for statistical purposes. Which of the following best describes your gender?
- Male
- Female
- Something else

What race or ethnic group best describes you? Please check all that apply.
- Asian or Asian-American
- Black or African-American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Middle Eastern
- Native American or Alaska Native
- Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
- White
- Something else

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
- Less than a high school degree or equivalent
- High school degree or equivalent (for example: GED)
- Some college, but no degree
- 2-year college degree (Associate's degree)
- 4-year college degree (Bachelor's degree)
- Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)

(∗) What is your current employment status?
- Employed full-time
- Employed part-time
- Unemployed
- Retired
- Full-time homemaker
- Student

- Something else

In what year were you born? Please enter a 4-digit number.
- (Text box.)

Which of the following describes your total annual household income from 2022—that is the total income everyone living in your household made together, before taxes, in 2022?
- Less than $20,000
- $10,000 to $39,999
- $40,000 to $59,999
- $60,000 to $79,999
- $80,000 to $99,999
- $100,000 to $119,999
- $120,000 to $149,999
- $150,000 to $199,999
- $200,000 or more

In which zip code do you currently reside? Please enter a 5-digit number.
- (Text box.)

Thank you for completing this survey. Your participation is greatly appreciated. Please share any comments you have about the survey. We welcome your feedback
- (Text box.)